Abstract. We present a correctness proof for a basic file system implementation. This implementation contains key elements of standard Unix file systems such as inodes and fixed-size disk blocks. We prove the implementation correct by establishing a simulation relation between the specification of the file system (which models the file system as an abstract map from file names to sequences of bytes) and its implementation (which uses fixed-size disk blocks to store the contents of the files). We used the Athena proof checker to represent and validate our proof. Our experience indicates that Athena's use of block-structured natural deduction, support for structural induction and proof abstraction, and seamless connection with high-performance automated theorem provers were essential to our ability to successfully manage a proof of this size.
Introduction
In this paper we explore the challenges of verifying the core operations of a standard Unix file system [20, 16] . We formalize the specification of the file system as a map from file names to sequences of bytes, then formalize an implementation that uses such standard file system data structures as inodes and fixed-sized disk blocks. We verify the correctness of the implementation by proving the existence of a simulation relation between the specification and the implementation.
The proof is expressed and checked in Athena, an interactive theorem-proving environment based on denotational proof languages (DPLs [3] ) for first-order logic with sorts and polymorphism. Athena uses a Fitch-style natural deduction calculus, formalized via the abstraction of assumption bases. High-level idioms that are frequently encountered in common mathematical reasoning (such as "pick any x and y · · · " or "assume P in · · · ") are directly available to the user. Athena also includes a higher-order functional language in the style of Scheme and ML and offers flexible mechanisms for expressing proof-search algorithms in a trusted manner (akin to the "tactics" and "tacticals" of LCF-like systems such as HOL [11] ).
The proof comprises 283 lemmas and theorems, and took 1.5 person-months of full-time work to complete. It consists of roughly 5,000 lines of Athena code, for an average of about 18 lines per lemma. It takes about 9 minutes to check on a high-end Pentium, for an average of 1.9 seconds per lemma. Athena seamlessly integrates cutting-edge automated theorem provers (ATPs) such as Vampire [21] and Spass [22] to mechanically prove tedious steps, leaving the user to focus on the interesting parts of the proof. Athena invokes Vampire and Spass over 2,000 times during the course of the proof. That the proof is still several thousand lines long reflects the sheer size of the problem. For instance, we needed to prove 12 invariants and there are 10 state-transforming operations, which translates to 120 lemmas for each invariant/operation pair (I, f ), each guaranteeing that f preserves I. Most of these lemmas are non-trivial; many require induction, and several require a number of other auxiliary lemmas. Further complicating matters is the fact that we can show that some of these invariants are preserved only if we assume that certain other invariants hold. In these cases we must consider simultaneously the conjunction of several invariants. The resulting formulas are several pages long and have dozens of quantified variables. We believe that Athena's combination of natural deduction, versatile mechanisms for proof abstraction, and seamless incorporation of very efficient ATPs were crucial to our ability to successfully complete a proof effort of this scale.
To place our results in a broader context, consider that organizations rely on storage systems in general and file systems in particular to store critical persistent data. Because errors can cause the file system to lose this data, it is important for the implementation to be correct. The standard wisdom is that core system components such as file systems will always remain beyond the reach of full correctness proofs, leaving extensive testing-and the possibility of undetected residual errors-as the only option. Our results, however, suggest that correctness proofs for crucial system components (especially for the key algorithms and data structures at the heart of such components) may very well be within reach.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 informally describes a simplified file system. Section 3 presents an abstract specification of the file system. This specification hides the complexity of implementation-specific data structures such as inodes and data blocks by representing files simply as indexable sequences of bytes. Section 4 presents our model of the implementation of the file system. This implementation contains many more details, e.g., the mapping from file names to inodes, as well as the representation of file contents using sequences of non-contiguous data blocks that are dynamically allocated on the disk. Section 5 presents the statement of the correctness criterion. This criterion uses an abstraction function [15] that maps the state of the implementation to the state of the specification. Section 5 also sketches out the overall strategy of the proof. Section 6 and Section 7 address the key role that invariants and proof tactics played in this project. Section 8 gives a flavor of our correctness proof by presenting a proof of a frame-condition lemma. Section 9 presents related work, and Section 10 concludes. The Appendix contains a description of the relevant parts of certain Athena libraries that were used in this project.
A Simple File System
In this section we describe the high-level structure of a simple file system. In Section 4 we present a formal model of such a file system.
In our file system the physical media is divided into blocks containing a fixed number of bytes. The contents of a file are divided into block-sized segments, and stored in a series of blocks that are not necessarily consecutive.
The file system associates each file with an inode, which is a data structure that contains information about the file, including the file size and which blocks contain the file data. Unlike actual UNIX file systems, the inodes in our system do not contain other information such as access privileges and time stamps.
There is only one directory, the root directory, which maps file names to inode numbers. No two file names can refer to the same file, so no two file identifiers can map to the same inode number. We also assume that the disk is unbounded-the file system has access to an infinite number of inodes and blocks.
To read a byte from a given file, the file system first looks up the file name in the root directory, and obtains the number of the corresponding inode. Assuming the file exists, the file system then looks up the inode. From the information in the inode, the file system determines if it is reading a byte that is within the bounds of the file size, and if so, which block contains the relevant byte. Finally, the file system reads the byte from that block and returns the value read.
A similar look-up process occurs when writing a byte in a file. In this case, if the file system is writing a byte that is within the bounds of the existing file size, it simply stores the new value to the appropriate byte. Otherwise, the file system extends the file up to the index of the byte it is writing. It then stores the appropriate value to the byte it is writing, and a default pad value to the bytes in between.
Our formalization consists of a set of axioms in first-order logic with sorts, polymorphism, and structural induction. We use generic Athena libraries that contain axiomatizations of natural numbers, value options, finite maps, and resizable arrays; see the Appendix for a brief description of those libraries.
Abstract specification of the file system
Our specification is an abstract model of the file system that hides the complexity of data structures such as inodes and data blocks by representing files as indexable sequences of bytes.
The specification uses the following sorts (the first two are introduced as new primitive domains, while the latter two are defined as sort abbreviations):
The sort Byte is an abstract type whose values represent the units of file content. FileID is also an abstract type; its values represent file identifiers. We define File as a resizable array of Byte. The abstract state of the file system, AbState, is represented as a finite map from file identifiers (FileID ) to file contents (File). We also introduce a distinguished element of Byte, called fillByte, which is used to pad a file in the case of an attempt to write at a position exceeding the file size: declare fillByte : Byte.
Specification of the abstract read operation
We begin by giving the signature of the abstract read operation, absRead :
Thus absRead takes a file identifier fid, an index i in the file, and an abstract file system state s; and returns an element of ReadResult. The latter is defined as the following datatype:
Therefore, the result of any absRead operation is one of three things: EOF , if the index is out of bounds; FileNotFound , if the file does not exist; or, if all goes well, a value of the form Ok (v) for some byte v, representing the content of file fid at position i. More precisely, the semantics of absRead are given by the following three axioms:
Using the equality conditions for finite maps and resizable arrays, we are able to prove the following extensionality theorem for abstract states:
(1)
Specification of the abstract write operation
The abstract write operation has the following signature:
This is the operation that defines state transitions in our file system. It takes as arguments a file identifier fid, an index i indicating a file position, a byte v representing the value to be written, and a file system state s. The result is a new state where the contents of the file associated with fid have been updated by storing v at position i. Note that if i exceeds the length of the file in state s, then in the resulting state the file will be extended to size i + 1 and all newly allocated positions below i will be padded with the fillByte value. Finally, if fid does not correspond to a file in s, then an empty file of size i + 1 is first created and then the value v is written. More precisely, we introduce the following axioms:
4 File system implementation Standard Unix file systems store the contents of each file in separate disk blocks, and maintain a table of structures called inodes that index those blocks and store various types of information about the file. Our implementation operates directly on the inodes and disk blocks and therefore models the operations that the file system performs on the disk. We omit details such as file permissions, dates, links, multi-layered directories, and optimizations such as caching. Some of these (e.g., permissions and date stamps) are orthogonal to the verification obligation and could be included with minimal changes to our proof, while others (e.g., caching) would likely introduce additional complexity.
File data is organized in Block units. A Block is an array of blockSize bytes, where blockSize is a positive constant. Specifically, we model a Block as a finite map from natural numbers to Byte:
We also define a distinguished element of Block , called initialBlock , such that:
In other words, an initialBlock consists of blockSize copies of fillByte.
File meta-data is stored in inodes:
An INode is a datatype consisting of the file size in bytes and in blocks, and a list of block numbers. The list of block numbers is an array of the block numbers that contain the file data. We model this array as a finite map from natural numbers (array indices) to natural numbers (block numbers). The data type State represents the file system state:
datatype State = state (inodeCount : Nat , stateBlockCount : Nat , inodes : FMap(Nat , INode), blocks : FMap(Nat, Block ), root : FMap(FileID, Nat ))
A State consists of a count of the inodes in use; a count of the blocks in use; an array of inodes; an array of blocks; and the root directory. We model the array of inodes as a finite map from natural numbers (array indices) to INode (inodes). Likewise, we model the array of blocks as a finite map from natural numbers (array indices) to Block (blocks). We model the root directory as a finite map from FileID (file identifiers) to natural numbers (inode numbers).
We also define initialState, a distinguished element of State, which describes the initial state of the file system. In the initial state, no inodes or blocks are in use, and the root directory is empty:
declare initialState : State initialState = state(0, 0, empty-map, empty-map, empty-map)
Definition of the concrete read operation
The concrete read operation, read , has the following signature:
The read 1 operation takes a file identifier fid, an index i in the file, and a concrete file system state s, and returns an element of ReadResult. It first determines if fid is present in the root directory of s. If not, read returns FileNotFound . Otherwise, it looks up the corresponding inode. If i is not less than the file size, read returns EOF . Otherwise, read looks up the block containing the data and returns the relevant byte. The following axioms capture these semantics (for ease of presentation, we omit universal quantifiers from now on; all variables can be assumed to be universally quantified):
Definition of the concrete write operation
The concrete write operation, write, takes a file identifier fid , a byte index i, the byte value v to write, and a state s, and returns the updated state:
If the file associated with fid already exists, write delegates the write to the helper function writeExisting. If the file does not exist, write first invokes allocINode, which creates a new, empty file, then calls writeExisting with the inode number of the new file. allocINode takes a file identifier fid and a state s, and returns an updated state:
allocINode creates a new inode by invoking getNextINode, then associates fid with the new inode.
getNextINode takes a state and returns an updated state. It allocates and initializes a new inode:
writeExisting takes an inode number n, a byte index i, the byte value v to write, and a state s, and returns the updated state:
If i is less than the file size, writeExisting delegates the writing to writeNoExtend , which stores the value v in the appropriate location. If i is not less than the file size but is located in the last block of the file, writeExisting delegates to writeSmallExtend , which stores the value v in the appropriate position and updates the file size. Otherwise, writeExisting first invokes extendFile, which extends the file by the appropriate number of blocks, and then calls writeNoExtend on the updated state.
writeNoExtend takes an inode number n, a byte index i, the byte value v to write, and a state s, and returns the updated state after writing v at index i:
writeNoExtend uses the helper function updateStateBM . The function updateStateBM takes the state, the block number bn, and the block block, and returns an updated state where bn maps to block:
writeSmallExtend takes an inode number n, a byte index i, the byte value v to write, and a state. It updates the file size and writes the byte value v at byte index i for the file associated with the inode number n, and returns the updated state:
extendFile takes an inode number n, the byte index of the write, and the state s. It delegates the task of allocating the necessary blocks to allocBlocks :
allocBlocks takes an inode number n, the number of blocks to allocate, the byte index j, and the state s. We define it by primitive recursion: ? P P P P P P q allocBlocks uses the helper function getNextBlock , which takes the state s, allocates and initializes the next free block, and returns the updated state:
The call graph summarizing the write operation is shown in Figure 1 . This call graph largely determines the auxiliary lemmas that need to be established every time we wish to prove a result about write. That is, whenever we need to prove a result L about write, we prove appropriate lemmas L 1 and L 2 about allocINode and writeExisting. In turn, L 1 will rely on a lemma L 11 about getNextINode and L 2 will reference lemmas L 21 , L 22 , and L 23 about writeNoExtend , writeSmallExtend , and extendFile, respectively; and so on. In this way we obtain a lemma dependency graph for L whose structure mirrors that of the call graph for write.
In what follows we will restrict our attention to reachable states, those that can be obtained from the initial state by some finite sequence of write operations. Specifically, we define a predicate reachableN ("reachable in n steps") via two axioms: reachableN(s, 0) ⇔ s = initialState, and
We then set reachable(s) ⇔ ∃ n . reachableN(s, n). We will write State for the set of all reachable states, and we will use the symbol s to denote a reachable state. Propositions of the form
5 The correctness proof
State abstraction and homomorphic simulation
This section presents a correctness criterion for the implementation. The correctness criterion is specified using an abstraction function [15] that maps the state of the implementation to the state of the specification.
Consider the following binary relation A from concrete to abstract states:
It follows directly from the extensionality principle on abstract states (1) that A is functional:
Accordingly, we postulate the existence of an abstraction function α : State → AbState such that:
That is, an abstracted state α(s) has the exact same contents as s: reading any position of a file in one state yields the same result as reading that position of the file in the other state.
Commuting diagrams for the read and write operations.
A standard way of formalizing the requirement that an implementation I is faithful to a specification S is to express I and S as many-sorted algebras and establish a homomorphism from one to the other. In our case the two algebras are I = (FileID , Nat, Byte, State; read , write) and S = (FileID , Nat , Byte, AbState; read, write)
The embeddings from I to S for the carriers FileID , Nat, and Byte are simply the identity functions on these domains; while the embedding from State to AbState is the abstraction mapping α. In order to prove that this translation yields a homomorphism we need to show that the two diagrams shown in Figure 2 commute. Symbolically, we need to prove the following:
and
Proof outline
Goal (2) follows immediately from the definition of the abstraction function α.
For (3), since the consequent is equality between two abstract states and we have already proven that two abstract states s 1 and s 2 are equal iff any abstract read operation yields identical results on s 1 and s 2 , we transform (3) into the following:
Finally, using (2) on the above gives:
Therefore, choosing arbitrary fid, fid , j, v, i, and s, we need to show L = R, where L = read (fid , i, write(fid , j, v, s)) and
Showing L = R is the main goal of the proof. We proceed by a case analysis as shown in Fig. 3 . The decision tree of Fig. 3 has the following property: if the conditions that appear on a path from the root of the tree to an internal node u are all true, then the conditions at the children of u are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (given that certain invariants hold, as discussed in Section 6). There are ultimately eight distinct cases to be considered, C 1 through C 8 , appearing at the leaves of the tree. Exactly one of those eight cases must be true for any given fid, fid , j, v, s and i. We prove that L = R in all eight cases.
For each case C i , i = 1, . . . , 8, we formulate and prove a pair of lemmas M i and M i that facilitate the proof of the goal L = R. Specifically, for each case C i there are two possibilities:
1. L = R follows because both L and R reduce to a common term t, with L = t following by virtue of lemma M i and R = t following by virtue of lemma
The desired identity follows because L and R respectively reduce to read (fid , i, s) and read(fid , i, α( s)), which are equal owing to (2). In this case, M i is used to show L = read (fid , i, s) and M i is used to show R = read(fid , i, α( s)): Fig. 3 . Case analysis for proving the correctness of write.
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Reachability invariants
Reachable states have a number of properties that make them "well behaved." For instance, if a file identifier is bound in the root of a state s to some inode number n, then we expect n to be bound in the mapping inodes(s). While this is not true for arbitrary states s, it is true for reachable states. In what follows, by a state invariant we will mean a unary predicate on states I(s) that is true for all reachable states, i.e., such that ∀ s . I( s).
Fig. 4. Main lemmas
There are 12 invariants inv 0 , . . . , inv 11 , that are of particular interest. The proof relies on them explicitly, i.e., at various points in the course of the argument we assume that all reachable states have these properties. Therefore, for the proof to be complete, we need to discharge these assumptions by proving that the properties in question are indeed invariants.
The process of guessing useful invariants-and then, more importantly, trying to prove them-was very helpful in strengthening our understanding of the implementation. More than once we conjectured false invariants, properties that appeared reasonable at first glance but later, when we tried to prove them, turned out to be false. For instance, a seemingly sensible "size invariant" is that for every inode of size fs and block count bc we have where div denotes integer division. For any inode of file size fs and block count bc, we will write szInv(fs, bc) to indicate that fs and bc are related as shown by the above formula. Figure 5 presents the twelve reachability invariants for our file system implementation. In the sequel we focus on the first four invariants, inv 0 ,inv 1 ,inv 2 ,inv 3 . These four invariants are fundamental and must be established before anything non-trivial can be proven about the system. They are also co-dependent, meaning that in order to prove that an operation preserves one of them, say inv j , we often need to assume that the incoming state not only has inv j but also one or more of the other three invariants. For instance, we cannot prove that write preserves inv 3 , i.e., that
unless we also assume that s has inv 0 . Or suppose we want to prove that writeExisting preserves any of the four invariants, say inv 0 , so that our goal is to show inv 0 (writeExisting(n, i, v, s)) on the assumptions lookUp (n, inodes(s)) = SOME (inode(fs, bc, bl ))
and inv 0 (s)
Consider the case bc ≤ i div blockSize, whereby writeExisting(n, i, v, s) returns writeNoExtend (n, i, v, extendFile(n, i, s)).
Since writeNoExtend is conditionally defined, we need to show that its three preconditions are satisfied in the intermediate state s 1 = extendFile(n, i, s). It is easy enough to show that the first precondition holds, i.e., that lookUp (n, inodes(s 1 )) = SOME (inode(fs 1 , bc 1 , bl 1 )) for some fs 1 , bc 1 , and bl 1 ; this follows from (4) and an auxiliary lemma stating that extendFile preserves the invariant I(s) ≡ inDom(n, inodes(s)) (for
inv11(s) : [lookUp (nodeNum, inodes(s)) = SOME (inode(fs, bc, bl )) ∧ i div blockSize < bc ∧ fs ≤ i ∧ lookUp (i div blockSize, bl) = SOME (bnum) ∧ lookUp (bnum, blocks(s)) = SOME (block )] ⇒ lookUp (i mod blockSize, block ) = SOME (fillByte) Fig. 5 . Reachability Invariants fixed inode number n). However, it is more challenging to show that the two remaining preconditions hold, i.e., that there exist bn 1 and block 1 such that lookUp (i div blockSize, bl 1 ) = SOME (bn 1 ) and lookUp (bn 1 , blocks(s 1 )) = SOME (block 1 ).
But these would follow immediately if we could show that s 1 has inv 1 and inv 2 and that i div blockSize < bc 1 . Showing that s 1 has inv 1 and inv 2 would also follow immediately if we strengthened our initial hypothesis (5) by additionally assuming that s has inv 1 and inv 2 , provided we have shown elsewhere that extendFile preserves both of these invariants. However, showing i div blockSize < bc 1 presupposes that s 1 has inv 3 . Consequently, we are led to assume that the original state s has all four invariants. Provided we have already shown that extendFile preserves each of the four invariants, it then follows that s 1 has all four of them, and hence that the preconditions of writeNoExtend hold.
Proving invariants
Showing that a unary state property I(s) is an invariant proceeds in two steps:
proving that I holds for the initial state, I(s 0 ); and 2. proving ∀ fid i v s . I(s) ⇒ I(write(fid , i, v, s)).
Once both of these have been established, a routine induction on n will show that ∀ n s . reachableN(s, n) ⇒ I(s).
It then follows directly by the definition of reachability that all reachable states have I.
Proving that the initial state has an invariant inv j is straightforward: in all twelve cases it is done automatically. The second step, proving that write preserves inv j , is more involved. Including write, the implementation comprises ten state-transforming operations, 3 and control may flow from write to any one of them. Accordingly, we need to show that all ten operations preserve the invariant under consideration. This means that for a total of ten operations f 0 , . . . , f 9 and twelve invariants inv 0 , . . . , inv 11 , we need to prove 120 lemmas, each stating that f i preserves inv j .
Most of the operations f i are defined conditionally, in the form
where x i , y i are lists of distinct variables; PC i (x i , y i ), the "precondition" of f i , is usually a conjunction of equations in the variables x i and y i (if f i is not defined conditionally then this can be regarded as the empty conjunction, i.e., as the constant true). Therefore, each of the 120 invariant-preservation lemmas is of the form
for i = 0, . . . , 9 and j = 0, . . . , 11, and where I(s) is of the form inv j (s) ∧ inv i1 ∧ · · · ∧ inv i k where k ≥ 0 and i r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 11} for 1 ≤ r ≤ k.
The large majority of the proof text (about 80% of it) is devoted to proving these lemmas. Some of them are surprisingly tricky to prove, and even those that are not particularly conceptually demanding can be challenging to manipulate, if for no other reason simply because of their volume. Given the size of the function preconditions and the size of the invariants (especially in those cases where we need to consider the conjunction of several invariants at once), an invariance lemma can span multiple pages of text. Proof goals of that scale test the limits even of cutting-edge ATPs. For instance, in the case of a proposition P that was several pages long (which arose in the proof of one of the invariance lemmas), Spass took over 10 minutes to prove the trivial goal P ⇒ P , where P was simply an alphabetically renamed copy of P (Vampire was not able to prove it at all, at least within 20 minutes). Heavily skolemizing the formula and blindly following the resolution procedure prevented these systems from recognizing the goal as trivial. By contrast, using Athena's native inference rules, the goal was derived instantaneously via the two-line deduction assume P in claim P , because Athena treats alphabetically equivalent propositions as identical and has an efficient implementation of proposition look-ups. This speaks to the need to have a variety of reasoning mechanisms available in a uniform, integrated framework.
There are many additional lemmas that were used in proving the invariants or in proving other results after all twelve invariants had already been proven. We mention two typical ones:
Lemma 2. If lookUp (n, inodes(s)) = SOME (inode 1 ) and lookUp (n, inodes(allocBlocks (n, k, j, s))) = SOME (inode 2 ) then blockCount (inode 2 ) = blockCount (inode 1 ) + k.
Proof automation with tactics
After proving a few invariance lemmas for some of the operations it became apparent that a large portion of the reasoning was the same in every case and could thus be factored away for reuse.
Athena makes it easy to abstract concrete proofs into natural-deduction proof algorithms called methods. For every state-transforming operation f i we wrote a "preserver" method P i that takes an arbitrary invariant I as input (expressed as a unary function that takes a state and constructs an appropriate proposition) and attempts to prove the corresponding invariance lemma.
P i encapsulates all the generic reasoning involved in proving invariants for f i . If any non-generic reasoning (specific to I) is additionally required, it is packaged into a proof continuation K and passed into P i as a higher-order method argument. P i can then invoke K at appropriate points within its body as needed. Similar methods for other functions made the overall proof substantially shorterand easier to develop and to debug-than it would have been otherwise. Consider, for example, proving that allocBlocks preserves a certain property I. This is always done by induction on k, the number of blocks to be allocated. Performing the base inductive step automatically, managing the inductive hypothesis, proving that the relevant precondition involving getNextBlock is satisfied in the context in which allocBlocks is called, deriving useful consequences of that fact, etc., these are all standard tasks that are repetitively performed regardless of I; we have abstracted all of them away in a higher-order method that accepts the I-specific reasoning as an input method.
Proof programmability was useful in streamlining several other recurring patterns of reasoning, apart from dealing with invariants. A typical example is this: given a reachable state s, an inode number n such that lookUp (n, inodes( s)) = SOME (inode(fs, bc, bl)), and an index i < fs, we often need to prove the existence of bn and block such that lookUp (i div blockSize, bl ) = SOME (bn) and lookUp (bn, blocks( s)) = SOME (block )
The reasoning runs as follows: first, from the reachability of s, we infer that it has certain invariants, including inv 0 , inv 1 , inv 2 , and inv 3 . From these invariants, the assumption i < fs, and standard arithmetic laws we may deduce (i div blockSize) < bc. From this, our initial assumptions, and inv 1 , we conclude that i div blockSize is in the domain of the mapping bl . Thus the existence of an appropriate bn is ensured, and along with it, owing to inv 2 , the existence of an appropriate block . We packaged this reasoning in a method find-bn-block that takes all the relevant quantities as inputs, assumes that the appropriate hypotheses are in the assumption base, and performs the appropriate inferences. The method also accepts a proof continuation K that is invoked once the goal has been successfully derived.
Another example is a slight extension of this method, named find-bn-block-val, that operates under the same assumptions but, in addition to a block number and the block itself, yields a value v such that lookUp (i mod blockSize, block ) = SOME (v), which is possible because i mod blockSize < blockSize. Yet another example of a streamlined proof method is an inductive method showing that an invariant holds for all reachable states.
A sample lemma proof
In this section we will prove lemma [M 8 ], which can be viewed as a frame condition: it asserts that performing a write operation on a given file leaves the contents of every other file unchanged. More specifically, let fid 1 refer to the file to be written, let fid 2 be any file identifier distinct from fid 1 , let s be any reachable state, and let s be the state obtained from s by writing some value into some byte position of fid 1 
The proof relies on four auxiliary lemmas about write, given below. Lemmas (8) and (9) handle the case when fid 1 (the file to be written) already exists in s, while (10) and (11) apply to the case when fid 1 is unbound in the root of s. As usual, all the variables are assumed to be universally quantified.
[lookUp (n1, inodes(s)) = SOME (inode1) ∧ n = n1 ∧ lookUp (fid , root(s)) = SOME (n)] ⇒ lookUp (n1, inodes(write(fid , i, v, s))) = SOME (inode1) (9) [lookUp (n1, inodes(s)) = SOME (inode1) ∧ lookUp (bn, blockList (inode1)) = SOME (bn ) ∧ lookUp (bn , blocks(s)) = SOME (block1) ∧ lookUp (fid , root(s)) = NONE ] ⇒ lookUp (n1, inodes(write(fid , i, v, s))) = SOME (inode1) ∧ lookUp (bn , blocks(write(fid , i, v, s))) = SOME (block1) (10) [lookUp (n1, inodes(b s)) = SOME (inode1) ∧ lookUp (fid , root (b s)) = NONE ] ⇒ lookUp (n1, inodes(write(fid, i, v, s))) = SOME (inode1) (11) In turn, each of the above four lemmas about write relies on a number of other lemmas about the various operations in the call graph of write (see the relevant remarks in Section 4). We will state those lemmas after we present the proof of
We next present a natural-deduction style proof of [M 8 ] to give the reader an idea of the abstraction level at which Athena proofs are written. We believe that the said level is roughly equivalent to the level at which a formally trained computer scientist would communicate the proof to another computer scientist of a similar background. The proof is rigorous and thorough, but does not descend to the level of primitive inference rules (such as introduction and elimination rules for the logical connectives or congruence rules for equality); the applications of such rules are fairly tedious steps that are filled in by Vampire. The overall proof is guided by constructs such as "pick any · · · ", "assume that such and such holds", "we distinguish two cases", "from P 1 , P 2 and P 3 we infer P ", and so on.
The proof of [M 8 ] is given below in English, but the level of detail and the overall structure of the argument are isomorphic to those of the formal Athena deduction (for instance, the formal Athena proof runs to 120 lines, whereas the English proof below is about 64 lines).
Lemma 3 ([M 8 ])
. If fid 1 = fid 2 then read (fid 2 , i, write(fid 1 , j, v, s)) = read (fid 2 , i, s).
Proof. Pick arbitrary fid 1 , fid 2 , i, j, v, and s, and suppose that
We will prove the goal
by distinguishing two (mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive) cases:
and ∃ n 2 . lookUp (fid 2 , root ( s)) = SOME (n 2 ).
If fid 2 is unbound in root ( s) (case (14)), then, by the definition of read , we have
By Lemma 1, (12), (14), and the reachability of s we conclude lookUp (fid 2 , root (write(fid 1 , j, v, s))) = NONE (17) and therefore again by the definition of read we infer read (fid 2 , i, write(fid 1 , j, v, s)) = FileNotFound (18) and hence (13) follows from (16) and (18). We now consider case (15), whereby
for some inode number n 2 . Since s is reachable, it has inv 0 , so that
for some fs 2 , bc 2 , and bl 2 . Moreover, we note that by Lemma 1, (19) , (12) , and the reachability of s, we have lookUp (fid 2 , root (write(fid 1 , j, v, s))) = SOME (n 2 ).
We proceed by distinguishing two cases, i < fs 2 and fs 2 ≤ i. Suppose first that i < fs 2 . In that case it becomes evident by inspection that all the preconditions of method find-bn-block-val are satisfied: s has the required invariants because it is reachable; n 2 is mapped by the inode mapping of s to the inode comprising fs 2 , bc 2 , and bl 2 ; and i < fs 2 . Therefore, we are able to prove that there exist bn 2 , block 2 , and v 2 such that lookUp (i div blockSize, bl 2 ) = SOME (bn 2 ) (22) lookUp (bn 2 , blocks( s)) = SOME (block 2 )
and lookUp (i mod blockSize, block 2 ) = SOME (v 2 ).
It now follows from (19) , (20), the assumption i < fs 2 , (22), (23), (24), and the definition of read that
and therefore our goal (13) becomes reduced to proving
We establish (26) by considering two subcases. First, suppose that fid 1 is unbound in the root of s, i.e.,
Then by (27), (20) , (22), (23), the reachability of s and Lemma (10), we conclude
and lookUp (bn 2 , blocks(write(fid 1 , j, v, s))) = SOME (block 2 ).
Accordingly, by the definition of read , (21), (28), the assumption i < fs 2 , (22), (29), and (24), we obtain the desired (26). Now suppose, by contrast, that
for some inode number n 1 . Since s is reachable, it has the invariant inv 7 , so from (30), (19) , and (12) we conclude
From (8), the reachability of s, (20) , (31), (22), (23), and (30) we can now again derive (28) and (29). Hence, by the definition of read , (21), (28), the assumption i < fs 2 , (22), (29), and (24) we obtain (26). We finally consider the possibility fs 2 ≤ i. In that case the definition of read in tandem with (19) and (20) entails
As before, we again distinguish two subcases, according to whether or not fid 1 is bound in the root of s, and we use lemmas (9) and (11), respectively, to infer (28). In combination with (21) , it follows from the definition of read that in either case we have
and the desired equality now follows from (32) and (33). This completes our case analysis and the proof.
Finally, we list below the remaining lemmas needed for lemmas (8) , (9), (10), and (11).
Related work
Techniques for verifying the correct use of file system interfaces expressed as finite state machines are presented in [9, 10, 8, 2] . In this paper we have addressed the more difficult problem of showing that the file system implementation conforms to its specification. Consequently, our proof obligations are stronger and we have resorted to more general deductive verification. Static analysis techniques that handle more complex data structures include predicate abstraction and shape analysis [19, 18, 14, 6] . These approaches are promising for automating proofs of program properties, but have not been used so far to show full functional correctness, as we do here. Security properties of a Unix file system are studied in [23, Chapter 10] ; these properties are orthogonal to the correct functioning of a file system for storing and reading data. A sample specification of a widely used file system is [1] . Simple abstract models of file systems have also been developed in Z [24, Chapter 15] .
Alloy [12] is a specification language based on a first-order relational calculus that has been used to describe the directory structure of a file system (but without modelling read and write operations). The Alloy Analyzer is a model finder for Alloy specifications that can be used to check structural properties of file systems in finite scope. The use of Alloy is complementary to proofs [4] . Alloy is useful for debugging, whereas our proofs ensure that the refinement relation holds for any number of files, any file sizes, and all sequences of operations. In addition, readable, high-level proofs can be viewed as explanations of why the file system implementation is correct, and therefore provide guidance to developers on how to modify the system in the future while preserving its correctness.
It is interesting to consider whether the verification burden would be lighter with a system such as PVS [17] or ACL2 [13] that makes heavy use of automatic decision procedures for combinations of first-order theories such as arrays, lists, linear arithmetic, etc. We note that our use of high-performance off-the-shelf ATPs already provides a considerable degree of automation. In our experience, both Vampire and Spass have proven quite effective in non-inductive reasoning about lists, arrays, etc., simply on the basis of first-order axiomatizations of the these domains. Our experience supports a recent benchmark study by Armando et al. [5] , which showed that a state-of-the-art paramodulation-based prover with a fair search strategy compares favorably with CVC [7] in reasoning about arrays with extensionality.
Conclusions
We have presented a correctness proof for the key operations (reading and writing) of a file system based on Unix implementations. We are not aware of any other file system verification attempts dealing with such strong properties as the simulation relation condition, for all possible sequences of file system operations and without a priori bounds on the number of files or their sizes. Despite the apparent simplicity of this particular specification and implementation, our proofs shed light on the general kinds of reasoning that would be required in establishing full functional correctness for any file system. Our results suggest that a combination of state-of-the art formal methods techniques greatly facilitates the deductive verification of crucial software infrastructure components such as file systems.
We have found Athena to be a powerful framework for carrying out a complex verification effort. Polymorphic sorts and structures allow for natural data modelling; strong support for structural induction facilitates inductive reasoning over such datatypes; a block-structured natural deduction format helps to make proofs more readable and writable; a higher-order functional metalanguage and assumption base semantics allow for powerful trusted proof tactics; and the use of first-order logic allows for smooth integration with state-of-the-art first-order ATPs, keeping the proof steps at a high level of detail. Our use of these features was essential in dealing with the strong properties arising from the simulation relation condition, where most of the complexity stems from the details of unbounded data structures.
A.2 Finite maps
Polymorphic finite maps are introduced in Athena as follows:
Here D and R are sort parameters, representing the sorts of the domain and the range of the map, respectively. The declaration states that every finite map from D to R is either the empty-map or else it is of the form update(m, x, v), i.e., it is an update of some other map m, obtained by binding the argument x to the value v (potentially overwriting whatever assignment x might have had in m).
Like data types, structures are inductively generated: axioms of the form (34) are valid for structures, and induction may be performed on them. However, structures are not necessarily freely generated (elements are not "uniquely readable"), hence Athena does not generate axioms such as (36) for structures. We introduce two additional useful function symbols for finite maps: We also have an extensionality axiom for finite maps: 
A.3 Resizable arrays
Resizable arrays are inductively generated by the following structure:
structure RSArray(S) = makeArray(S, Nat ) | arrayWrite(RSArray(S), Nat, S, S)
That is, a resizable array is either of the form makeArray(x, n), which is a freshly constructed array of length n with the element x in every location from 0 to n−1; or else it is of the form arrayWrite(A, i, x, f ), i.e., obtained from an already existing array A by writing the value x into slot i. If i happens to be outside the bounds of A (i.e., arrayLen(A) ≤ i), then the length will increase to i + 1, the value x will be written into the i th position of this extended array, and all the other newly allocated slots will be padded with the "fill" value f . This is made more clear in the axioms of Figure 6 . Two additional useful functions are:
arrayLen : RSArray(S) → Nat arrayRead : RSArray(S) × Nat → Option(S) 
A.4 Natural numbers
Numeric reasoning played an important role in this project. Although no deep number-theoretic results were needed, it was still necessary to introduce all the usual arithmetic operations, including the remainder operation, and derive many simple results for them. We start by introducing the natural numbers as an algebraic datatype:
datatype Nat = zero | succ(Nat)
This definition automatically generates the following axioms: ∀ x . zero = succ(x) ∀ x, y . succ(x) = succ(y) ⇒ x = y ∀ x . x = zero ∨ (∃ y . x = succ(y)) which are then added to the assumption base.
Next, we introduce function symbols for the predecessor operation:
declare pred: Nat → Nat as well as for (binary) addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, and remainder: declare +, −, * , div, mod : Nat → Nat
We also introduce operators for numeric comparisons:
declare <, ≤: Nat × Nat → Boolean
The semantics of these symbols are given via equational axioms (possibly conditionally equational axioms) that capture the usual primitive recursive definitions of these operations. For example, predecessor is defined as a total function as follows:
pred(zero) = zero ∧ ∀ x . pred(succ(x)) = x
The definition of binary addition is given via the two axioms:
∀ y . zero + y = y ∀ x, y . succ(x) + y = succ(x + y)
The definitions of subtraction, multiplication, and numeric comparisons are given by the following axioms: The less-than-or-equal symbol is defined in terms of less-than:
x ≤ y ⇔ x = y ∨ x < y
The definitions of quotient and remainder are as follows: ∀ x . x div zero = zero ∀ x, y . x < y ⇒ x div y = zero ∀ x, y . (y = zero) ∧ ¬(x < y) ⇒ x div y = succ((x − y) div x) ∀ x . x mod zero = x ∀ x, y . x < y ⇒ x mod y = x ∀ x, y . x < y ⇒ x mod y = x ∀ x, y . (y = zero) ∧ ¬(x < y) ⇒ x mod y = (x − y) mod y From the above definitions, a number of useful properties can be derived, e.g., that addition is commutative. Most of these properties are derivable only with the aid of a mathematical induction principle-in our case, structural induction on the datatype Nat. Structural induction in this case corresponds to conventional mathematical induction on the natural numbers. Occasionally it is very convenient to be able to use strong induction instead, whereby one inductively assumes the truth of the statement P (n) for all m < n. For instance, the so-called "division algorithm" result, which states can be readily proved by strong induction but is much more tedious with conventional induction. In Athena, a strong induction principle on natural numbers is currently formulated as a primitive method. Figure 7 depicts some numeric results that were needed at various points in the project. Most of them were proved automatically by Athena methods that mechanize induction, but a few of them required more detailed proofs. The reader can refer to the file nat.ath in the source code listing for details.
